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*ETHOLOGIA OR AETIOLOGIA IN SUETONIUS DE GRAMMATICIS c. 4, AND QUINTILIAN i. 9*

BY RODNEY P. ROBINSON

In preparing a critical edition of Suetonius *De Grammaticis et Rhetoribus*, based upon a collation of photographic reproductions of the eighteen manuscripts known to be extant, which I hope to have ready for publication before the end of the year, I have been greatly puzzled by the reading *ethologias* (c. 4) (Reifferscheid, p. 104, l. 3), which is given by all the editions<sup>1</sup> since that of Beroaldus, 1504. The passage reads as follows:<sup>2</sup>

Veteres grammatici et rhetoricae docebant, ac multorum de utraque arte commentarii feruntur. secundum quam consuetudinem posteriores quoque existimo quamquam iam discretis professionibus nihilo minus uel retinuisse uel instituisse et ipsos quaedam genera institutionum ad eloquentiam praeparandam, ut problemata paraphrasis allocutiones ethologias atque alia hoc genus; ne scilicet siccii omnino atque aridi pueri rhetoribus traderentur.

The reading *ethologias* is not found in a single manuscript, but seems to be a conjecture of Beroaldus.<sup>3</sup> It is also found in the edition of Aldus, 1508, who may have taken it from Beroaldus, but possibly made a slight correction in the reading *aethologias* of the Florentine edition of 1478. This edition is little more than a transcription of the Copenhagen manuscript, which reads *aetheologias*. The eighteen manuscripts of the fragment of Suetonius are all of the fifteenth century and are derived from a single ninth- or tenth-century archetype. The reading of the Copenhagen manuscript differs but little from those of six of the others representing the best

<sup>1</sup> Tross in his edition of 1841 publishes the reading of the Leyden manuscript *ethiologias*. This edition, however, is practically a transcript of the above-mentioned manuscript.

<sup>2</sup> I quote from the text of Reifferscheid (Leipzig, 1860), in which a careful examination of the manuscripts convinces me more than one reading will have to be changed.

<sup>3</sup> The edition of Beroaldus according to Panzer, IX, p. 411, 28b, first appeared at Bologna in 1504. I have a photographic reproduction, secured from the Royal Library at Berlin, of the edition printed at Strasbourg with Pliny (*sic*) *De Viris Illustribus* in 1510.

tradition, which have *aethiologias ethiologias aethyologias*. The inferior, badly interpolated manuscripts, together with three of the better ones, have *aethimologias aethymologias ethimologias ethymologias etymologias ethymnologias*, which are all, of course, variant spellings of *etymologias*. This is clearly an interpolation and may be left out of consideration. The testimony of the better manuscripts points clearly to *aethiologias* in the archetype, which in turn plainly indicates *aetiologias* (*αἰτιολογίας*) as the genuine reading.

The commentators on Suetonius commonly cite as a parallel passage Quintilian i. 9, *De Officio Grammatici*. The part which concerns us here begins with paragraph 3:<sup>1</sup>

- sententiae quoque et chriae et ethologiae subiectis dictorum rationibus apud grammaticos scribantur, quia initium ex lectione ducunt: quorum omnium similis est ratio, forma diuersa, quia sententia uniuersalis est uox, ethologia personis continetur. chriarum plura genera traduntur: unum simile sententiae, quod est positum in uoce simplici “dixit ille” aut “dicere solebat”: alterum, quod est in respondendo “interrogatus ille,” uel “cum hoc ei dictum esset, respondit”: tertium huic non dissimile “cum quis dixisset aliquid uel fecisset.” etiam in ipsorum factis esse chrian putant ut “Crates, cum indoctum puerum uidisset, paedagogum eius percussit,”
- 5      et aliud paene par ei, quod tamen eodem nomine appellare non audent, sed dicunt χρειῶδες, ut “Milo, quem uitulum adsueuerat ferre, taurum ferebat.” in his omnibus et declinatio per eosdem dicitur casus, et tam factorum quam dictorum ratio est.
- 10

Upon examining this passage, however, my perplexity is only increased, for here too the words *ethologiae*, l. 1, and *ethologia*, l. 4, have no manuscript authority whatever, but apparently rest upon a conjecture of Regius in the Venetian edition of Locatellus, 1493. The testimony of the manuscripts is practically the same as in Suetonius, save that here a number have *-t-* instead of *-th-*: *aethiologiae aetiologiae ethimologia theologie*; and below: *ethiologia aetiologya aetimologia ethymologia*. Nor do the commentators offer much assistance, since they are for the most part content to refer to the above-mentioned passage in Suetonius.

It is incomprehensible to me that every manuscript both of Suetonius and of Quintilian should exhibit the same error of the vowel *-i-* or *-y-* inserted between the letters *-t-* (or *-th-*) and *-o-*;

<sup>1</sup> I quote from the text of Halm, 1868. The numbering of the lines is my own.

which we must assume to be the case if we accept the reading of the editions. Feeling certain that the various forms of *aetiology*, as representing the manuscript tradition, must be restored to the text of both authors if the meaning will permit, I have endeavored to ascertain from the original sources the signification of each word. This investigation, while certainly not exhaustive, has been sufficient to convince me that not only is *aetiology* perfectly intelligible in all of the places to which I have referred, but in Quintilian at least is better suited to the context.

Concerning *aetiology* the testimony is fairly abundant. St. Augustine defines it as one method of exposition, *De Gen. ad Lit. Imperf. Lib. 2:*

quattuor modi a quibusdam scripturarum tractatoribus traduntur legis exponendae, quorum uocabula enuntiari graece possunt, latine autem definiri et explicari: secundum historiam, secundum allegoriam, secundum analogiam, secundum aetilogiam . . . . aetiology, cum causae dictorum factorumque redduntur.

#### *De Utilitate Credendi 5:*

Omnis igitur scriptura, quae testamentum uetus uocatur, diligenter eam nosse cupientibus quadrifarium traditur: secundum historiam, secundum aetilogiam, secundum analogiam, secundum allegoriam . . . . secundum aetilogiam, cum ostenditur, quid qua de causa uel factum uel dictum sit.

As a rhetorical figure *aetiology* is frequently mentioned by the grammatical writers. Alexander Rhetor i. ἡ (Spengel, III):

Αἰτιολογία δέ ἔστιν, ὅταν προθέντες τι πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι σαφέστερον αὐτὸν αἰτίαν προσαποδιδώμεν, ὡς φησι Δημοσθένης, ‘έάν τις ἐν ἄθλοις τινὰ ἀποκτείνῃ, τοῦτον δὲ νομοθέτης ὥρισε μὴ ἀδικεῖν. διὰ τί; ὅτι οὐ τὸ συμβὰν ἐσκέψατο, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ δράσαντος διάνοιαν ἔστι δὲ αὕτη τίς; ζῶντα νικῆσαι, οὐκ ἀποκτεῖναι,’ καὶ τὰ ἔξῆς.

#### *Rutilius Lupus ii. 19 (Halm, p. 21):*

Αἰτιολογία. Hoc schema efficitur ratione brevi et sententiosa, ita ut, quod dubium est visum, ad certam fidem adduci videatur. *Isocratis.* “Quod vobis, Athenienses, in suadendo adsentiuntur, vos fallere possunt. Nam dictum ad voluntatem auditoris obscurat quaestionem utilitatis. Sed ab iis, qui suadent, quod vobis iniucundum est, decipi non potestis. Non enim sententias vestras valent commutare, nisi vobis evidens bonum sui consilii patefecerint.”

*Carmen De Figuris* 25 (Halm, p. 64):

*Aἰτιολογία.* Redditio causae porro est.

*Iulius Rufinianus* 8 (Halm, p. 40):

*Απόφασις* sive *Aἰτιολογία*, venustum schema, ubi quasi alio interrogante nobis ipsis respondemus et rationem reddimus . . . . Et hactenus, ubi nobis respondemus, alias, ubi aliis; quod nisi arte procedit, causam prodit . . . . Testis interrogatus in reum, an fustibus vapulasset: “et innocens,” inquit. Aut cum dicitur, “quaero an occideris hominem”? et respondeatur “latronem,” ut confessionem praecurrat defensio.

*Schema Dianoeas* 17 (Halm, p. 73):

*Aἰτιολογία* est, cum causam alicuius rei et rationem subicimus, ut est apud Ciceronem pro Roscio: “Ita fit ut adsint propterea, quod officium sequuntur, taceant autem idcirco, quia periculum vitant.”

This last definition is the same as the *ad propositum subiecta ratio* of Cicero *De Orat.* iii. 207, upon which Quintilian ix. 3. 93, comments as follows: “Quod uero schema est ad propositum subiecta ratio, quod Rutilius *aἰτιολογίαν* uocat”?<sup>1</sup>

These definitions all agree as to the general meaning of the word, and are what might be expected from its etymology. *Aetiology* is, then, in a general way “redditio causarum dictorum factorumque” or “the advancing of the reasons for what has been said and done.” It must, of course, be borne in mind that the definitions quoted above contain no reference to *aetiology* as an exercise for the schools.

Unfortunately the evidence is not so plentiful for *ethologia*. Both the Greek and Latin lexicons cite Suetonius and Quintilian without mentioning the fact that the reading has no manuscript authority, but I can find only one instance of the word supported by the manuscript reading. This is Seneca *Epist.* 95. 65. The same passage is also very illuminating in regard to *aetiology*:<sup>2</sup>

Posidonius non tantum praeceptionem, nihil enim nos hoc verbo uti prohibet, sed etiam suasionem et consolationem et exhortationem necessariam iudicat. his adicit causarum inquisitionem, aetiologian quam quare nos dicere non audeamus, cum grammatici, custodes Latini sermonis, suo iure ita appellant, non video. ait utilem futuram et descriptionem cuiusque virtutis: hanc Posidonius ethologian vocat, quidam characterismon

<sup>1</sup> I quote from the text of Halm. The manuscripts have *utrum* after *vocat*, which most editors insert before *Quod*. This gives a reading unintelligible to me.

<sup>2</sup> I quote from the Teubner text of Hense, 1914.

appellant, signa cuiusque virtutis ac vitii et notas reddentem, quibus inter se similia discriminentur. haec res eandem vim habet quam praecipere. nam qui praecipit, dicit: "illa facies, si voles temperans esse," qui describit, ait: "temperans est, qui illa facit, qui illis abstinet." quaeris, quid intersit? alter praecpta virtutis dat, alter exemplar.

Here the words are used with special reference to philosophy. The *aetiologia* becomes an *inquisitio causarum* instead of a *reditio causarum*. The *ethologia* is a *descriptio virtutum et vitiorum*, that is, a delineation of virtues and vices, just as might be expected from its etymology. The cognate words *ethologus* (*ἠθολόγος*) and *ἠθολογέω* have reference to the actor's profession, and throw no light upon *ethologia* in the passages under consideration. According to Seneca *characterismos* is synonymous with *ethologia*. Several examples of the former are cited in the *Thesaurus*. It will be sufficient to quote the definition of Rutilius Lupus, who has in mind the rhetorical figure, ii. 7 (Halm, p. 16):

**Χαρακτηρισμός.** Quem ad modum pictor coloribus figuras describit, sic orator hoc schemate aut vitia aut virtutes eorum, de quibus loquitur, deformat.

Let us now return to Quintilian i. 9, and examine the relative merits of the two words so far as their meanings are concerned. First let us assume temporarily that *ethologia* is the correct word. Quintilian says that *sententiae*, *chriae*, and *ethologiae* all have the same purport (*quorum omnium similis est ratio*), but differ in form. The *sententia* "*uniuersalis est uox*," while the *ethologia* "*personis continetur*"; that is, a *sententia* is a general expression, while an *ethologia* is limited by a reference to an individual. This might be interpreted to mean that a *sententia* is a maxim of universal application, while an *ethologia* is a maxim as applied to an individual case; but that this is not the exact meaning Quintilian wishes to convey will, I think, become apparent from what follows. He gives no definition of the *chria*, but quotes some examples. Hermogenes, paragraph 3 (Spengel, II, p. 5) is very illuminating at this point. "The *χρεία*," he says, "is the recounting in a concise manner of some saying or act, or of both together, usually for the purpose of setting forth something that will be of practical application."<sup>1</sup> He goes on

<sup>1</sup> χρεία ἐστιν ἀπομημόνευμα λόγου τινὸς ή πράξεως ή συναμφοτέρου, σύντομον ἔχων δῆλωσιν, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον χρησίμου τινὸς ἔνεκα.

to say that there are three kinds of *χρεῖαι*, namely *λογικαὶ*, *πρακτικαὶ*, and *μικταὶ*. Of the *λογικαὶ* he gives this example: Πλάτων ἔφησεν τὰς Μούσας ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν εὐφυῶν οἰκεῖν. Of the *πρακτικαὶ* he gives the example quoted by Quintilian with the name of Diogenes substituted for that of Crates: Διογένης ἵδων μειράκιον ἀτακτοῦν τὸν παιδαγωγὸν ἐτύπτησε. For the *μικταὶ*, which recount both a saying and an act, he gives: Διογένης ἵδων μειράκιον ἀτακτοῦν τὸν παιδαγωγὸν ἐτύπτησεν εἰπών, τί γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἐπαίδενες; Quintilian's first and second kinds of *chriae* are both to be classified under the *λογικαὶ* of Hermogenes, the first having to do with a statement alone, the second with a question and its answer. His fourth example (ll. 8–9) comes clearly under the *πρακτικαὶ*, while the third example (l. 7) might be either, but differs from the others merely in the manner in which the introductory clause is expressed. Quintilian does not give an example of the *χρεία μικτή*. Hermogenes is equally clear in regard to the distinction between *χρεία* and *γνώμη* or *sententia*. “The *χρεία* differs from the *γνώμη* in that the latter is set forth by declaration alone, while the former is often expressed by means of question and answer. The *χρεία* has to do with acts as well as sayings, while the *γνώμη* has to do with sayings alone. Further the *χρεία* gives the name of the person who makes the statement or does the act, the *γνώμη* is adduced without the mention of any person.”<sup>1</sup> The fundamental difference, then, between *χρεία* and *γνώμη* is one of form, for the former must give the name of the author of the saying, while the latter omits the name. If we omit the words Πλάτων ἔφησεν in the first example of *χρεία* given by Hermogenes it becomes a *γνώμη* or *sententia*: αἱ Μούσαι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν εὐφυῶν οἰκούσιν. There may, however, be a difference in content between the *χρεία* and the *γνώμη*, since the former may treat of acts as well as words, the latter has to do with words alone. The *γνώμη* or *sententia* is, then, a maxim quoted without the name of the author; the *χρεία* may be a maxim with the name of the author added, or it may be an anecdote. Quintilian's examples of *chriae* agree for the most part with what Hermogenes tells of them, but

<sup>1</sup> γνώμης δὲ διαφέρει τῷ τὴν μὲν ἐν ἀποφάνσει ψιλῇ λέγεσθαι, τὴν δὲ χρείαν πολλάκις κατ' ἐρώτησιν καὶ κατ' ἀπόκρισιν· καὶ πάλιν τῷ τὴν μὲν χρείαν καὶ ἐν πράξεσιν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ γνώμην ἐν λόγοις μόνον. καὶ πάλιν τῷ τὴν μὲν χρείαν τὸ πρόσωπον τὸ πεποιηκός ξένιν, τὴν δὲ γνώμην ἄνευ προσώπου λέγεσθαι.

it is very disconcerting that the distinction which the latter makes between *γνώμη* and *χρέια* is the very one that the former makes between *sententia* and *ethologia*. Since this is the case, it must be apparent that *ethologia* is very similar to, if not almost synonymous with *chria*.

Can any interpretation of *ethologia* be devised whereby it will signify practically the same thing as *chria*? This is clearly impossible if we interpret the word as an exercise in which the pupils by their actions and manner of speech are to imitate certain types of persons. This, however, seems to be the interpretation of Halm, who in his critical note to the word, in addition to the inevitable reference to Suetonius, cites Quintilian vi. 2. 17:

non parum significanter etiam illa in scholis ἡθη dixerimus, quibus plerumque rusticos, superstitiones, auaros, timidos secundum condicioneum propositionum effingimus: nam si ἡθη mores sunt, cum hos imitamur, ex his ducimus orationes.

In the foregoing passage Quintilian seems to refer to certain exercises in declamation, which would certainly be far too advanced for the school of the *grammaticus*, but would have their place in that of the *rhetor*. Certainly there is no similarity between an *ethologia* so understood and a *chria*. It is interesting to note, however, that this is just what we would expect *ethologia* as an exercise for the schools to mean, from the comparison with the cognate word *ethologus*.<sup>1</sup> Neither can *ethologia* be interpreted as a "character sketch" to be composed by the pupil, for when Quintilian says that *sententiae*, *chriae*, and *ethologiae* are to be "written" under the direction of the teacher, he can have in mind only the usual proverbs, maxims, and anecdotes, which are to be worked over by the pupils in much the same manner, we may suppose, as the fables of Aesop and passages from the poets, which, as he tells us in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the same chapter, are to be paraphrased by condensation and amplification, and to be transformed in other ways.<sup>2</sup> We know that there were numerous collections of *exempla* in antiquity, such as the *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia* of Valerius Maximus and the

<sup>1</sup> Cic. *De Orat.* ii. 242: *mimorum est enim et ethologorum, si nimia est imitatio, sicut obscenitas.* *Ibid.* ii. 244.

<sup>2</sup> Complete accounts of the ways in which *γνῶμαι* and *χρέαι* are to be treated are given by Hermogenes, Apthonius, and Theon.

*Exempla* of Cornelius Nepos,<sup>1</sup> which must have provided the teachers with abundant material for such exercises. As evidence that Quintilian does not have original compositions<sup>2</sup> in mind there is his own statement that these exercises all have their beginning in reading (I. 2). Seneca, moreover, *Epist.* 33. 7, says: *pueris et sententias ediscendas damus, et has quas Graeci chrias vocant.* Finally Quintilian (I. 12) tells us that “all of these” are to be declined through the same cases.<sup>3</sup> Whether by *his omnibus* he means *sententiae, chriae,* and *ethologiae*, or merely the various kinds of *chriae*, is not clear. The latter seems more probable, but what possible connection can there be between a *chria* as an exercise for declension and an *ethologia* as a character-sketch to be composed by the pupil?

Can any other meaning be attached to *ethologia*? The *exempla* in the collections mentioned above very often had a moral bearing. A glance at the headings of the chapters in the work of Valerius Maximus is sufficient evidence.<sup>4</sup> The very word *chria* suggests a saying or an anecdote with a moral bearing, and Hermogenes states expressly that *χρεῖαι* usually have some practical application. Might *chria* be a general term, and *ethologia* a specific form of *chria* destined to inculcate some moral principle? This does not seem impossible, and as an illustration I will quote an *exemplum abstinentiae*, stated in the form of a *chria*, taken from Julius Paris' epitome of *Valerius Maximus* (iv. 3. 5):

M'. Curius, cum ad eum Samnites aurum adtulissent donaturi, “malo” inquit “locupletibus imperare quam ipse fieri locuples.”

<sup>1</sup> See Litchfield in the *Harvard Studies*, XXV (1914), 62–63.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. F. H. Colson's article on *Phaedrus and Quintilian I. 9. 2* in the *Classical Review* for May–June, 1919, p. 59, has very recently come to my attention. Mr. Colson makes the statement that this ninth chapter deals with forms of exercise in original composition. Since the manner of handling these exercises is so definitely described by the Greek rhetorical writers, agreement or disagreement with Mr. Colson will depend upon what we understand by an *original composition*. This question, however, is of little importance in determining the inappropriateness of *ethologia* in the passage. Mr. Colson himself, in fact, speaks of the *doubtful “ethology,”* and prefers the manuscript tradition *aetiologia*.

<sup>3</sup> An example of what is meant by this *declinatio* is given by Diomedes, p. 310 (Keil).

<sup>4</sup> Examples of chapter headings are: Lib. iii, “*De fortitudine*,” “*De patientia*,” “*De fiducia sui*;” “*De constantia*;” Lib. vi, “*De pudicitia*,” “*De iustitia*.”

As an illustration of another possible form of *ethologia* we may take Hor. *Epist.* i. 18. 6-7:

asperitas agresuis et inconcinna grauisque,  
quae se commendat tonsa cute, dentibus atris,

upon the second line of which Porphyrio comments: *Characterismos hominis tristis et amari*. With the words *Horatius dixit* pre-fixed we might make this *characterismos* or *ethologia* into a *chria*: *Horatius dixit, asperitatem agrestem et inconcinnam grauemque tonsa cute et dentibus atris se commendare*. Still another possible interpretation of *ethologia* as an exercise for the schools will be suggested by the *Characters* of Theophrastus. From the foregoing it will be seen that a fairly good case might be made for *ethologia* if it had any manuscript authority, but since the word is found but once among all the Greek and Roman authors and its meaning in Quintilian or Suetonius could be determined only by conjecture, surely we should hesitate to adopt it even for a hopelessly corrupt manuscript reading.

Let us now substitute the manuscript readings *aetiologyae* and *aetiologia*, and see if after all they are not quite satisfactory. First we should be prejudiced in favor of this word by the statement of Seneca *Epist.* 95. 65 (quoted above) that *aetiologya* is a term which the *grammatici* employ *suo iure*. If we restore *aetiologyae* to line 1 of the passage in Quintilian does not the meaning of the ablative absolute *subiectis dictorum rationibus* at once become apparent, while formerly it was vague to say the least? These words now refer to *aetiologyae* alone, and we have here its definition: the *reddito dictorum factorumque causarum* of Augustine, the *ad propositum subiecta ratio* of Cicero. Doubtless Quintilian would have been more accurate had he said *subiectis dictorum factorumque rationibus*, just as in line 13 he says *et tam factorum quam dictorum ratio est*.<sup>1</sup> An *aetiologya*, it becomes evident, is a *chria*, but a *chria* with the addition of the cause or reason for the saying or the act set forth. This opinion seems to be confirmed by the testimony of Theon, *Progymnas.* (Spengel, II, pp. 96 ff.), who gives an elaborate account of the various forms of *χρεία*. As a subdivision of the *λογικά* he mentions the

<sup>1</sup> In line 1 I take *rationibus* to be the equivalent of *causis*, *ratio* in line 13 to have a broader meaning just as it has in line 3.

*κατ' ἔρωτησιν αἰτιώδεις*, which in addition to the answer to the question contain the reason for the answer.<sup>1</sup> He cites the following example: Σωκράτης ἔρωτηθείς, εἰ εύδαιμων αὐτῷ δοκεῖ ὁ τῶν Περσῶν βασιλεύς, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν, εἶπε, μηδὲ γὰρ εἰδέναι πῶς ἔχει παιδείας. Furthermore Theon states that a *χρεία* may be presented ἀποδεικτικῶς, giving this example: Ἰσοκράτης ὁ ῥήτωρ παρήνει τοῖς γνωρίμοις προτιμᾶν τῶν γονέων τοὺς διδασκάλους, διτὶ οἱ μὲν τοῦ ζῆν μόνον, οἱ δὲ διδάσκαλοι καὶ τοῦ καλῶς ζῆν αἴτιοι γεγόνασιν. The two *chriae* just quoted may well be illustrations of what Quintilian means by *aetiology*. Might not the example of *χρεία μικτὴ* given by Hermogenes be at the same time an *aetiology*, the *aitia* being contained in the words *εἰπών*, “*τί γὰρ τοιαῦτα ἐπαίδευες;*”? A possible example in Latin is the anecdote used by Quintilian vi. 3. 77, to illustrate *causarum relatio*, which must mean the same as *aetiology*:

sed eleuandi genus est etiam causarum relatio, qua Cicero est usus in Vatinium. Qui pedibus aeger, cum uellet uideri commodioris ualeitudinis factus et diceret, se iam bina milia passuum ambulare, *Dies enim*, inquit, *longiores sunt*.

Modeling this upon Quintilian's second kind of *chria* we should have: *Cicero, cum Vatinius ex pedibus aeger commodioris ualeitudinis factus uideri uolens diceret, se iam bina milia passuum ambulare, respondit, “Dies enim longiores sunt.”*

In Suetonius it cannot be so clearly determined from the context alone which word is preferable, but *ethologias* certainly gives no better sense than *aetilogias*. Since Quintilian cannot rightly be cited in support of *ethologias* in Suetonius, and since nothing is gained for the perspicuity of the passage by its use, I shall have no hesitation in restoring to the text the reading of the archetype, with the slight change involved in the deletion of the letter *-h-*.

NOTE.—Since writing the foregoing article I have read Wilhelm Christ's review of Reifferscheid's edition of the *Reliquiae* of Suetonius in *Philologus* 18 (1862), 159 ff. Christ, without entering into a discussion of the matter, declares in favor of *aetilogias*, making the Greek *αἰτιολογία* equivalent to the Latin *ratiocinatio*.

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<sup>1</sup> *αἱ δὲ κατ' ἔρωτησιν αἰτιώδεις εἰσὶν, ὅσαι χωρὶς τῆς πρὸς τὴν ἔρωτησιν ἀποκρίσεως καὶ αἰτιῶν τινὰ ἔχουσιν η συμβολὴν η τι τοιοῦτον.*